The Realignment That Could Remake the Scottish Right

Reform’s success will depend on whether it can evolve beyond populism, and protest—and offer a credible, Scottish, answer to centre-right discontent.

Reform’s rise could mark a day of reckoning for the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (SCUP), long burdened by brand rot and a deep cultural disconnect that has left the centre-right adrift in Scotland.

The country may be on the foothills of a political realignment, as Reform UK climbs in the Holyrood polls. But whether this signals a seismic shift or just background noise remains to be seen. The ingredients for realignment are there — but its scale and staying power will hinge on one key question: will the Scottish Conservatives opt to adapt, or die?

The Historical Constraints of Scottish Conservatism

Many trace the historic collapse of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (SCUP) to the Thatcherite policies of the 1980s. In truth, though, the decline began much earlier — in April 1965. Prior to that date, Labour had risen to replace the Liberals as one of the two dominant forces in Scottish politics, the other being the Unionist Party.

Contrary its name, the Unionist Party was far from the hard-nosed, late-20th-century unionism that came to define the SCUP. In fact, it embodied what might best be described as a “unionist-nationalist” tradition — firmly rooted in Scottish identity while affirming Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom and the British Empire. This duality is perhaps best captured by John Buchan, the Unionist MP for the Combined Scottish Universities constituency, who famously declared: “I believe every Scotsman should be a Scottish nationalist.” Tellingly, the Scottish Party — which eventually merged with the National Party of Scotland to form the modern SNP — was originally founded by figures from within the Unionist ranks.

The Unionist Party was no minor force. It produced two UK Prime Ministers — Bonar Law and Alec Douglas-Home — and uniquely among postwar parties, secured over 50 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland in both the 1931 and 1955 general elections.

A key part of its success was that it was not viewed through the prism of English Toryism, nor was it tied to the centralising instincts of Scottish Labour. That began to unravel in 1965 with the formal merger with the Conservative Party. Though the Scottish Conservative and Unionist branding remains, it is just that: branding. The merger fundamentally reshaped how the political centre-right would be perceived in Scotland from that point forward.

When Thatcher displaced Ted Heath, she extinguished the last remnants of the devolutionary spirit that had once been a key strand to the old Unionist tradition of the 1920s through 1960s. The 1965 merger, combined with Thatcherite policies, meant the only centre-right political vehicle left in Scotland became — unfairly, in many respects — associated with the Englishness of the modern Conservative Party. That perception only deepened as Labour gradually modernised, abandoned centralising clause-4 instincts, softened its image, and began to embrace devolution.

No longer seen as a distinctly Scottish political force, the SCUP came to symbolise centralising unionism — the very opposite of the Unionist Party's appeal in 1931 and 1955, when it was seen as a bulwark by many Scottish voters against Labour’s socialist centralism. Thatcher-era policies — from privatisation to the poll tax — proved deeply unpopular north of the border and further entrenched the sense of disconnect as she staunchly opposed devolution.

The result is a long-standing asymmetry in Scottish politics: there may well be a sizable constituency with broadly centre-right values, but no culturally acceptable party to represent them. Whether on fiscal prudence, law and order, or social conservatism, the pool of what we might loosely define as ‘centre-right’ voters seems to exceed, by some margin, the actual electoral strength of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party.

The Centre-Right Vote Base: Suppressed, Not Absent

There is a latent market in Scotland for a culturally rooted, economically moderate, socially traditional — yet modernised — centre-right party. However, this potential has long been constrained by two forces: the toxic legacy of the Conservative brand and the dominance of constitutional questions in defining party identities.

Social attitudinal and polling data suggests that this market exists, and has done for some time. The 31st British Social Attitudes Survey, conducted during the year of the independence referendum, revealed that many Scots held views consistent with centre-right politics, regardless of their position on the Union. On immigration, for instance, the BSA found that 77 per cent of people across Britain wanted immigration reduced, while data from the Scottish Centre for Social Research showed that 62 per cent of Scots felt the same — a clear indication that Scotland was not as exceptional as political rhetoric often suggested.

Further support for this comes from Sir John Curtice and Ian Montague’s December 2018 paper, Do Scotland and England & Wales Have Different Views About Immigration?, which reinforces earlier findings from 2013–14. Their research confirmed that while Scots may be marginally more liberal than their English counterparts, the difference is modest — and certainly not sufficient to suggest a fundamentally different political outlook on issues like immigration:

“The proportion of people who view the economic and cultural consequences of immigration positively is similar on both sides of the border:

In Scotland, more people believe immigration is good for the British economy (46%) than believe it is bad (17%). But the same is true In England & Wales, where 47% think immigration is good for the economy and 16% think it is bad

In Scotland, more people think immigration enriches British culture (43%) than undermines it (20%). Again, the picture in England is very similar, with 43% believing immigration has a positive impact upon British culture and 23% believing that it has a negative impact.”

In short, “In short, while Scotland would appear on balance to have a relatively positive view of the economic consequences of migration, it is no different in this respect from England & Wales”

Beyond immigration, even on questions of taxation, Scottish and English social attitudes have tended to move in similar directions — suggesting that the appetite for a centre-right fiscal outlook does not differ dramatically between the two nations.

YouGov’s March 2025 taxation survey supports this view: while 33 per cent of English voters said the government’s priority should be to cut taxes, a comparable 29 per cent of Scottish voters expressed the same view. The difference is marginal — not enough to support the idea of a fundamentally divergent political culture when it comes to economic priorities.

The real obstacle, then, is not a question of identity — not some clash of ‘Scottishness vs Britishness.’ Ironically, it’s the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party brand itself that acts as the political roadblock. As academics like James Mitchell and Sir John Curtice have long argued, while Scotland may lean more social democratic than England, this is largely a matter of degree — and shaped just as much by the party identities associated with particular policies as by the policies themselves.

Reform UK’s Rise: Signal or Noise?

Now that we've established a significant segment of the Scottish electorate is inclined toward a centre-right outlook, it’s worth turning to the rise of Reform UK. In Scotland, its growth is more muted than in England — but nonetheless notable, particularly in working-class, unionist-leaning areas such as parts of the Central Belt, Aberdeen, and the north-east.

Reform presents itself as an anti-establishment vehicle, absorbing disillusioned Conservative votes — especially from those who are anti-SNP but see the Tories as ineffective. A case in point is my former boss, Brian Monteith, Editor of Think Scotland, whose own political journey spans from being a Scottish Conservative MSP to serving as a Brexit Party MEP. His trajectory is emblematic of the broader drift: voters who once aligned with traditional Toryism but have since shifted toward a more insurgent, populist right.

Crucially, Reform is also gaining ground in post-industrial constituencies where the SNP’s economic credibility has eroded and Labour has yet to fully rebuild trust. Even if Reform UK were to poll only 5–10% in a Westminster election, that could be electorally significant. Such a result could:

• Undermine tactical anti-SNP voting for the Tories

• Break the entrenched SNP–Labour binary in key constituencies

What this reveals is the existence of a culturally unionist, economically interventionist, right-leaning vote — one more reminiscent of Blue Labour or Red Wall Conservatism than of traditional Scottish Toryism. It's a strain of opinion that’s never felt comfortable with the SCUP’s Thatcherite baggage, but isn’t instinctively drawn to Labour or the SNP either.

Reform’s key strength lies in its ambiguity. It isn’t tethered to the old Westminster conventions, party traditions, or ideological purity. And, interestingly, neither the party nor its de facto leader, Nigel Farage, carries the stigma of overt unionist branding — something that may paradoxically broaden its appeal in Scotland.

The latest Holyrood polling suggests the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party is now in a fight for survival. A recent Survation projection has Reform on track to win 19 MSPs, compared to just 14 for SCUP. Other pollsters, such as Norstat (formerly Panelbase), still show the Conservatives holding the insurgency at bay — but the direction of travel is clear.

Clearly there is an appetite for anti-green, anti-immigration, and anti-establishment messaging in Scotland — however does Reform in Scotland represent realignment, or merely a pressure valve for discontent with SCUP?

Is This a Realignment? Not Yet—but the Soil is Shifting

To call this a “realignment” on the political right in Scotland would be premature. Reform has no Scottish infrastructure or leadership, and is still perceived as a London-centric protest party. This is even if I acknowledge their ambivalence on the constitution and focus on populist themes seems to enable them to hoover up disenchanted voters tired of SCUP, SNP, and SLabour.

Nevertheless, the Scottish Conservatives remain the only viable right-of-centre party in Holyrood under current electoral dynamics. The ability of Reform to truly burst into Holyrood on the back of 13 per cent national vote share is open to question between now and the next Holyrood election. Not least since the constitutional question still polarises the electorate more than traditional left-right divides.

But what is happening is evidence of softening loyalty and vote fluidity. The old tribal repulsion toward the Tories doesn’t automatically extend to new right-leaning options, particularly among younger working-class voters or alienated unionists.

If Reform UK falters (as many expect), it could still leave behind some important openings:

• A space for a new kind of centre-right party: economically pragmatic, culturally rooted in Scottish identity, and constitutionally unionist but not aggressively so.

• Or it could serve to pressure the Scottish Conservatives to reform themselves, perhaps under new leadership, by shedding some of the baggage of their past.

This echoes what Ruth Davidson briefly achieved: a less toxic brand that reached parts of the electorate who had written off the Tories.

If a new centre-right political vehicle is to emerge, it would be one which could successfully rebrand the centre right in Scotland beyond Thatcherism, and deindustrialisation. At the same time, one capable of jettisoning the additional post-1965 baggage of the Scottish centre-right party being perceived not as an independent political force, but rather as a British unionist outpost. This would entail embracing a kind of soft Unionism, and focusing on competent governance, law and order, and economic realism — it could flourish.

Conclusion: A Realignment in the Making, Not Yet Realised

So, we might say: yes, there is a realignment underway—but it's still incipient, partial, and highly contingent. Reform UK’s rise reveals a suppressed demand for a Scottish centre-right option not tied to the legacy of Thatcherism. Whether that demand becomes a political force depends on whether any party can credibly fill that space with cultural legitimacy, organisation, and vision.

If nothing else, this moment is a stress test for the Scottish Conservatives: can they evolve to capture this base before someone else does? For the Scottish Tories, if they were smart they would once again re-engage with the politics of fiscal discipline, free markets, anti-identity politics narratives, and the political economics of growth. All whilst emphasising that the nasient and amorphous Reform should be seen by Scots as an outpost of English nationalism.

There have been no electoral contests allowing us to test whether we’re witnessing a durable shift. However, Reform nevertheless would need to reframe unionism in some way to truly secure pre-eminence — to make itself palatable to many centre-right Scottish voters.

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Dean M Thomson is currently a lecturer with Beijing Normal - Baptist University (BNBU), formerly known as Beijing Normal - Hong Kong Baptist University, United International College (UIC).

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