CHINA AT A CROSSROAD: UNDERSTANDING THE RECENT PROTESTS
China has been gripped by unprecedented protests in recent months, but the causes are multifaceted and it is about more than frustrations with zero-covid policies.
Beijing, April 25th, 1999, started as a relatively breezy day as a 12 Celsius morning swept through the Chinese capital. The usual collection of ruling Communist officials gathered for work at the centre of the nation. Zhongnanhai, no longer the Imperial gardens of the celestial son of the heavens, it now serves as the central headquarters for the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the State Council (central government) of China. But what had began as a typical day like any other would rapidly morph into a panic for the governing party.
That day practitioners of an increasingly popular new-religious movement called Falun Gong begin quietly assembling outside the Central Appeals Office. A building adjacent to the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing. It came amid growing allegations of unfair suppression of the religion, despite numerous official government statements denying it.
These peaceful protesters numbers soon balloon to anywhere between 10,000-20,000, slowly over the day. They soon occupy the streets surrounding the Zhongnanhai leadership compound, sparking panic inside the Communist leadership. Eventually, five Falun Gong representatives meet with Premier Zhu Rongji to request official recognition and an end to escalating harassment against the group. Zhu agrees to their demands, which included the release of detained Tianjin practitioners.
But later at the urging of Luo Gan (Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission), Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin issues a letter stating his intention to thoroughly suppress the practice.
Memories of what is officially referred to only as the “June 4th Incident” haunts the collective leadership in Beijing. So the Falun Gong April 1999 episode evoked among the Chinese leadership at the time memories of the events of Tiananmen in 1989.
That was then, few including myself could imagine that anything worse than the Falun Gong protests could possibly erupt on mainland China. Sure, Hong Kong and some of the outer regions with significant ethno-religious differences from the Han majority always were unstable. But the ethnically Han heartland of the centuries old Chinese civilisation? Hard to picture huge popular anger.
After all, Chinese economic development accelerated as the 21st century dawned. This was a government which could boast lifting 700m citizens out of grinding absolute poverty; the post-Mao mantra seemed to hold: ‘you say out of politics, we’ll stay out of your private life’. Promises of social stability and economic betterment carries huge weight in China, a country still scarred by the century of national humiliation, where foreign powers burnt down the Summer Palace of the Emperors. Grandparents today recall the famine of Mao’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ and a few even older still recall the dark chaos of the warlord era, and the brutal Chinese civil war.
In today’s China social stability and common prosperity isn’t a slick government talking point. This rhetoric taps into a deep-seated desire among generations of Chinese citizens to be strong again, and never again suffer the degradations of the 1850s - 1950s.
So how have we ended up here today, as widespread mass protests are erupting across mainland China? Everywhere you look, from ethnically Muslim Xinjiang to Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou in the south, unprecedented scenes are playing out.
Resetting the leadership
Chinese history in the Communist era can best be summed up by the shadows of two hugely important leaders. The first historical arc of the People’s Republic can be described as the Mao era. Under his aegis he crushed the nationalists, driving them to Taiwan (where their heirs bequeathed the ‘Republic of China - known informally as Taiwan). He forced heavy industrialisation, collectivisation of property and agriculture and brutally suppressed all opposition (including inside the party). This was the era of the ‘Great Leap Forward’, where Mao insisted on ‘Peoples Communes’ be formed and meet increasingly unobtainable grain quotas. Officials terrified of his ‘anti-rightist’ political purges faked documents and non-existent grain quotas were reported.
15-55 million Chinese starve to death in the subsequent famine of 1960-62. This is still remembered by the grandparents of some of my Chinese students today; who recall siblings perishing amid the destitution.
This was followed by the ‘Cultural Revolution’ of 1966-76. Officially aiming at purging the country of lingering capitalism and anti-communist sentiment, it would continue until Mao Zedong passes away. Unofficially, Mao used it to purge any political opposition to his personal rule. Young students were radicalised, encouraged to denounce professors. Famously, Deng Xiaoping would be among other famous political leaders post-Mao who suffer amid the social upheaval.
It is unknown how many perished in the subsequent purges over these 10 years. Although an interesting tit-bit of history is that the man who successfully ‘re-educated’ the last Emperor of China, was also purged during this time. As writer Samuel Edward Buhr wrote, “In the eyes of Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders, Pu Yi, the last Emperor, was the epitome of all that had been evil in old Chinese society. If he could be shown to have undergone sincere, permanent change, what hope was there for the most diehard counter-revolutionary?”1
During the chaos of the Cultural Revolution Mao purged the men who successfully “remodelled” Puyi, and ended his rights to visit the Chinese countryside "(lest he witness the mass starvation, purging and chaos and it undermine his new found “faith in communism”)
Importantly, the father of Xi Jinping also falls from grace inside the party during this time, and Jinping’s family face substantial hardship. Xi Jinping would remember these days, but not resentfully, rather he looks back on it as an important piece of his formal education. He learns that he may be a Tàizǐdǎng (princeling), coming from political communist blue blood, but nothing comes before the party and its dialectical needs.
Resetting the leadership: Deng Xiaoping-Hu Jintao
The point here is that after Mao died, his arc ends and we see the second great arc of Chinese communist history with the rise of Deng Xiaoping.
Deng would become the “Architect of Modern China”, introducing free-market reforms and insisting on a “peaceful development” approach to foreign policy. He crafts the institutions which lift 700m people out of poverty, he introduced the check on political power where the new convention was Premiers get two terms (then step down). Deng is the era summed up by “speak softly and carry a big stick”, and the ‘One China two systems’ policy for unification of all China. Controversially he ordered the crackdown during the ‘June 4th Incident’ in 1989, but despite this he left a structure emphasising economic growth, a peaceful foreign policy and social progress.
Chinese society starts to liberalise and open up as a new middle class forms amid the huge economic prosperity.
But this Deng arc officially ended when President Hu Jintao’s second term ended in November 2012. Jintao respects the Deng principle of two terms, no more, and his successor is Xi Jinping.
Xi Jinping’s rise to power resulted from a collective awareness that popular anger at political corruption within the organs of the ruling Communist Party needed to be tackled more rigorously. Failure to do so risked undermining popular support for the government. The Deng generation of Communist leaders realised serious anti-corruption purges needed to take place, and saw in Xi Jingping a Tàizǐdǎng (princeling). They assumed he would tackle the corrupt officials, but not stray too far from the Deng settlement. They were seriously wrong.
The era of ‘peaceful development’, a conservative approach to foreign policy and domestic reform would end. Xi Jinping was a sincere communist dialectician, and had other plans.
Marxist Nationalism: ‘Xi Jinping thought’
Xi Jinping’s arc of leadership can be best summed up by calling time on the Deng Xiaoping-Hu Jintao era where ideology had been largely dormant in China. Xi Jinping's era represents a coordinated effort to reimpose a Marxist ideological framework in China to re-solidify - as he sees it - a Communist Party endangered by a semi-capitalist/state capitalist society slowly experimenting with various forms of gradual liberalisation. Xi, as former Australian Prime Minister (and expert academic Sinologist) kevin Rudd describes, is China’s “ideologist in chief”.
Xi has overseen two significant changes since coming to power:
Shifting Chinese politics firmly toward the Marxist-Leninist left
This is designed to reimpose the totality of the ruling communist party control over the totality of the economy, society and politics. So, this explains Beijing’s recent war on the first generation millionaires, accumulating in famous big tech billionaire Jack Ma being 'convinced’ to step away from some aspects of his Chinese business empire.
Property, finance, business all marginalised amid a re-emphasis on state command control over the economy. This is party why Chinese economic growth has slowed in recent years (it isn’t just about covid).
Marxist Nationalism
Xi may have pushed the economy and society to the left, but on foreign policy he has shifted right. This is the new era of ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, much more assertive on the global stage and flexing military muscle whilst stoking domestic nationalist fervour.
Under Xi Jinping, ideology now matters in China. He has introduced ‘Xi Jinping thought’ in schools. Originally this book was designed to emphasise policies and ideas derived from the writings and speeches of Xi Jinping. But following 11 March 2018 the Chinese constitution itself was rewritten to include a mention of ‘Xi Jinping thought’. Many have referred to this as the territory of a Maoist' ‘personality cult’ which Deng Xiaoping and others had worked to hard to put an end to.
Deng Xiaoping’s period was basically summed by an instruction to stop disputing ideology and instead focus on developing the economy. Xi Jinping represents a fundamental challenge if not rejection of much of those post-Maoist principles.
Zero-covid, MRNA vaccine nationalism and growing societal frustration
This brings us to more recent events, which alongside the history mentioned also feed into explaining recent social protests happening across mainland China.
In the opening three weeks of COVID in China, it was catastrophically mishandled. The covid virus was first reported by Dr Li Wenliang, a Chinese ophthalmologist who warned his colleagues about early COVID-19 infections in Wuhan. But instead of anyone listening to him, Dr Li on 3 January 2020 endured a visit from the Wuhan Public Security Bureau. They were investigating Dr Li’s Wechat (Chinese Whatsapp only better) comments about discovering the virus among patients he had encountered. The Security police interrogated Li, issued a formal written warning and censuring him for "publishing untrue statements about seven confirmed SARS cases at the Huanan Seafood Market”. He was made to sign a letter pledging to never do it again and officially subjected to admonishment for “recalcitrant behavior would result in a prosecution.”
Dr Li three weeks later was proven correct all along, but would lose his life to the pandemic, dying on 7 February 2020 aged just 33. He had the courage of the whistle-blower, and had authorities listened to him, the covid-19 health disaster may have been contained inside China rather than spreading into a global crisis.
Upon his death, Chinese state authorities would censor most mentions of Dr Li.
But the slow reaction time to the early outburst of Covid-19, and the shocking attempt to cover-up the crisis in the opening weeks has not been the only mistake authorities have made, that has been noticed among the Chinese population.
Another major error has proved to be officials slow-walking approval for the western produced mRNA vaccine - which has proven to be the most effective coronavirus vaccines the world has to offer. Instead, earlier this year Beijing authorities had insisted that a home-produced mRNA vaccine was within reach, yet it still has not appeared.
This failure to use the western produced mRNA vaccines, combined with a conservative culture among Chinese elderly reluctant to take vaccinations, has created a crisis. China has poor vaccination rates, especially 3rd boosters, among those aged 65+, and as a result has been forced to persevere with its harsh zero-covid lockdown strategy long after the rest of the world has moved on.
Under Xi Jinping China has become much more inward focused, seeking greater self-reliance and nationalistic and thus the apparent refusal to authorise use of the western produced mRNA vaccine smacks of politics. As Alexandra Stephenson of the New York Times puts it, “The delay in recognizing a foreign mRNA vaccine now appears to be a part of that deeply political exercise.”2
Zero-covid has involved harsh lockdowns on whole cities, workers made to sleep in factories for weeks and in certain cases longer. Whole apartment buildings fenced up to keep residents inside and stern officials in hazmat suits making people endure testing any time they wish to leave (assuming they are permitted).
But it was the fencing people in their homes which ultimately proved to be the greatest error.
The spark that set China alight
In the city of Urumqi, Xinjiang in North-Western China a fire erupted in an apartment complex, but despite frantic phone calls to fire services residents found themselves unable to escape the burning building. The strident lockdowns imprisoning residents in their homes for months on end in Urumqi meant it became impossible to escape the smoke and heat, as families found emergency exists unusable and fencing ceiling the main exists.
As toxic fumes tore upward from the 15th to the 17th floor, ten people perished as the flames consumed the building. When news of this made its way onto Chinese social media, it has proved to be the spark that has set alight more than just frustrations with Covid policy. Suddenly the popular outcry at the Xinjiang dead has become something of a catalyst for much deeper societal frustrations with the leadership in Beijing.
Unprecedented mass protests spreading across the mainland
Even before the Xinjiang disaster, there has already been signs of unprecedented societal frustration with the new direction China has been taking since Xi Jinping replaced Hu Jintao.
One example was the incredible scene of a lone protester who seized Sitong Bridge, an overpass on Beijing third ring road. He did this on the eve of Jinping’s securing the unprecedented post-Mao third term in power.
One banner read “Say no to Covid test, yes to food. No to lockdown, yes to freedom. No to lies, yes to dignity. No to cultural revolution, yes to reform. No to great leader, yes to vote. Don't be a slave, be a citizen,”
Another: “Go on strike, remove dictator and national traitor Xi Jinping,” Given the tough sacrifices many have made under zero covid lockdowns, it’s unsurprising some public upset would bubble up. China has had an unhappy 2022, so social stability will be weaker than normal.
While protests are common in China, they're usually for short periods of time & focused on local issues. That major protests are erupting across *mainland China* criticising the ruling Communist party is frankly unprecedented since events of Tiananmen.
Earlier this month in Guangzhou, southern China, people broke out of their homes, tore down the barriers trapping them in their homes and defied the men in hazmat suits and rejected the city lockdown ordinance. Taking to the streets, officials could only look on helplessly.
Just this week in Beijing students have grown furious at the Chinese Government after it alleged the Xinjiang fire and subsequent protests in China were the result of "anti-China foreign forces". Students furious at this were filmed at a protest screaming "Which foreign forces you are talking about? Marx & Engels?! We can't even go abroad on the Internet! We only have forces within our borders to prevent us from gathering!"
And just last night, on the 27th November a crowd of at least 100 attempted to make its way to Tiananmen Square in Beijing , chanting, “We want universal values,” “We want freedom, equality, democracy, rule of law,” “We don’t want dictatorship,” “We don’t want personality cult.” This is no longer simply about frustrations with zero-covid policy, there are signs people yearn to a return to the Xiaoping-Jintao era, and are deeply unhappy with the Marxist-Nationalism of Xi Jinping.
In recent days across multiple university campuses across mainland China, students have gathered to protest. They hold up blank white pieces of paper, as a symbol denouncing press and internet censorship. Just as the ‘June 4th Incident’ of 1989 was driven by young pro-democracy students, I cannot help escape the feelings of echoes of it today. One hopes that wherever all of this leads, it won’t repeat the tragedy of the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Declaration: I am a former lecturer in ‘Anglo-American Society and Culture’ with Shandong Agricultural University (SDAU) in Tai’an, Shandong China. I continue to occasionally do seasonal online seminar classes with SDAU. In no way should my article be construed as advocating for any particular political outcome inside the Peoples Republic of China. I respect the rights of the Chinese people to determine their own future and hope for a peaceful way forward.
Behr. The Last Emperor. p. 256, https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/725040.The_Last_Emperor
Stephenson (2022, 18 Feb), ‘These Vaccines Have Been Embraced by the World. Why Not in China?’, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/business/china-coronavirus-vaccines.html